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European state aid control, a part of competition policy, typically follows the logic of 
negative integration. It significantly constrains the potential for Member States to dis-
tort competition by reducing their ability to subsidize industry. In addition, this paper 
argues, ambiguous Treaty rules and heterogeneous Member States’ preferences have 
enabled the European Commission to act as a supranational entrepreneur, not only 
enforcing the prohibition of distortive state aid, but also developing its own vision of 
“good” state aid policy. In order to prevent or to settle political conflict about individual 
decisions, the Commission has sought to establish more general criteria for the state aid 
which it still deems admissible. These criteria have been codified into a complex system 
of soft law and, more recently, hard state aid law. The Commission has thus created 
positive integration “from above” and increasingly influences the objectives of national 
state aid policies.
Zusammenfassung
Als Teil der europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik folgt die Beihilfekontrolle der Logik ne-
gativer Integration. Sie beschränkt die Möglichkeiten der Mitgliedstaaten erheblich, 
Unternehmen zu subventionieren und so den Wettbewerb zu verzerren. Darüber hi-
naus, so das Argument des Papiers, konnte die Europäische Kommission aufgrund 
auslegungsbedürftiger Vertragsregeln und angesichts heterogener Interessen der Mit-
gliedstaaten als supranationaler Entrepreneur handeln und hat dabei nicht nur das Ver-
bot wettbewerbsverzerrender Beihilfen durchgesetzt, sondern auch ihre eigene Vision 
„guter“ Beihilfepolitik entwickelt. Um politische Konflikte über Einzelentscheidungen 
zu vermeiden beziehungsweise beizulegen, hat die Kommission schrittweise allgemeine 
Kriterien für zulässige staatliche Beihilfen formuliert. Diese Kriterien wurden zu einem 
komplexen System von weichem und neuerlich auch hartem Beihilferecht ausdifferen-
ziert. Die Kommission hat dadurch positive Integration „von oben“ geschaffen und be-
einflusst zunehmend die Ziele staatlicher Beihilfepolitik.
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1 Introduction
The objectives of national state aid policies are increasingly predetermined at the Euro-
pean level. In its 2005 State Aid Action Plan (SAAP), for example, the European Com-
mission calls for a “modernised state aid policy in the context of the Lisbon strategy for 
growth and jobs” and sets out its own vision of “key priorities” for national state aid 
policy (European Commission 2005). At the national level, empirical evidence indicates 
a considerable convergence of state aid policies towards so-called “horizontal” objec-
tives (as opposed to sectoral objectives). Based on comparative data from the EU State 
Aid Scoreboard, the Commission concludes: “The clear move towards ‘better targeted 
aid’ continues with almost two thirds of Member States now awarding more than 90 
percent of their aid to horizontal objectives” (European Commission 2007c: 4). 
This trend of convergence is puzzling, as major contributions to integration theory 
would lead us to see it as both undesirable and unlikely. European competition policy, 
including state aid control, is typically regarded to constitute one of the core areas of 
negative integration – aiming at eliminating distortions of competition rather than har-
monizing national economic policies (cf. Scharpf 1999: 49; Wallace 2005: 80). Econom-
ically liberal authors have persistently argued for the primacy of such market-making 
goals in the process of European integration (Majone 1996, 2005: 143–161; Streit/Muss-
ler 1995). According to their view, European competences in the field of state aid are 
restricted to the protection of competition and do not permit European intervention in 
favor of specific targets of national state aid policy (Danwitz 2000: 16). While Scharpf 
is critical of economic liberalism, he provides an institutional explanation as to why 
we observe this asymmetry of European integration, privileging negative over positive 
integration goals. On the one hand, Treaty rules on market freedoms and competition 
policy have been progressively interpreted by non-majoritarian, supranational actors: 
the Commission and the European Courts. On the other hand, majority or unanimity 
requirements in the Council and in the European Parliament make it relatively difficult 
to reach agreement upon secondary rules, mostly those related to issues of positive in-
tegration (Scharpf 1999: 52f., 70f.).
How then do we explain the evolution of an increasingly complex system of European 
rules on specific state aid objectives and, accordingly, the convergence of domestic bud-
getary policies towards the objectives defined at the European level? This paper argues 
that ambiguous Treaty rules and heterogeneous Member States’ preferences have enabled 
the Commission to act as a supranational entrepreneur, not only enforcing the prohibi-
tion of distortive state aid, but also partially creating positive integration “from above.” 
I would like to thank Szymon Gebski, Miriam Hartlapp, Armin Schäfer, Waltraud Schelkle, Susanne 
K. Schmidt, Heike Schweitzer, Julia Sievers, Ingeborg Tömmel, and the participants of the NewGov 
Workshop in Berlin, 2 February 2008, for their very helpful comments. Funding provided by the 
6th Framework program of the European Union (Contract No CIT1-CT-2004-506392) is gratefully 
acknowledged.
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From the beginnings of the integration process, European Treaty rules have constituted 
a rather vague compromise between different, often conflicting views on national state 
aid policy and its supranational control. In balancing the general prohibition on state 
aid against possible exceptions, the Commission has always had to assess, at least im-
plicitly, not only the effects that a certain state aid measure would have on competition, 
but also its potential contributions to other policy goals such as competitiveness or 
cohesion. The Commission has therefore sought to establish more general criteria for 
the state aid measures that it deems compatible with the common market, in order to 
prevent or to settle political conflict about individual state aid decisions. By codifying 
these criteria into a complex system of soft law and, more recently, hard law, the Com-
mission has not only shielded itself from political pressure and reduced its workload in 
individual cases, but has also developed a more or less explicit model of what it consid-
ers to be “good” state aid policy.
The paper has three parts, with the first (Section 2) describing the institutional situation 
in the field of state aid, the actors involved, and their potentially conflicting interests. 
European Treaty rules on state aid control essentially constitute a compromise – aim-
ing for undistorted competition while acknowledging the potentially welcome effects 
of state aid – and they leave the European Commission with considerable discretion 
in balancing these different goals against each other. The second part (Section 3) will 
develop the main argument: that given the vagueness of European Treaty rules and the 
initial unwillingness of the Council to agree upon secondary legislation, the Commis-
sion has made a virtue of necessity and developed state aid control via soft law. For-
mally, this soft law binds only the Commission itself – in practice, however, it defines 
positive criteria for national state aid policies compatible with the common market and 
leaves little room for Member State aid policies which deviate from these criteria. The 
concluding section will summarize the major findings and discuss the limits of positive 
integration from above.
2 State aid control and state aid policy in conflict 
European Treaty law appears to allocate clear competences in the field of state aid be-
tween two main actors. On the one hand, the Commission has the task to control na-
tional state aid in order to prevent distortions of competition in the internal market. 
On the other hand, it remains the Member States’ exclusive competence to design and 
to execute their individual aid policies, as long as they do not violate European competi-
tion law. In terms of positive vs. negative integration, the Commission’s role seems to 
be confined to the latter. 
In practice, however, this distinction is far from clear-cut. Article 87 of the EC Treaty 
strikes a sensitive balance between a general prohibition of state aid and possible excep-
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tions. In interpreting and applying these Treaty rules, the Commission often gets into 
direct conflict with the Member States. First, the scope of the state aid prohibition and 
the procedure of its enforcement are contested. Second, the possibility to except certain 
state aid measures from the general prohibition gives rise to conflict about how much 
autonomy remains when designing national state aid policies. It is this second type of 
conflict – arising not only between the Commission and EU Member States, but also 
within the Commission – which is increasingly predetermined by means of soft and 
hard state aid law. 
The Treaty rules
In contrast to cartel or merger control, state aid rules govern Member states’ budgetary 
policies rather than the behavior of enterprises (Ehlermann 1995: 3; Smith 1998: 57). 
Outside the EU, no comparable system of state aid control exists as a part of compe-
tition policy (Ehlermann/Goyette 2006; Schenk 2006). European state aid control is 
therefore often considered to be “the most original of the EU’s competition policies” 
(Cini/McGowan 1998: 135; Thielemann 1999: 405). Articles 87–89 of the EC Treaty, 
which have remained almost unchanged since their incorporation into the original 
Treaty of Rome (cf. Wishlade 2003: 3), rest on a particularly sensitive compromise. They 
balance between the liberal vision of an integrated market and the Member States’ pre-
rogative to intervene in their own economies (Immenga/Mestmäcker 2007: 834f.; Hobe 
2000: 19). Even more than EC Treaty rules in general, European state aid rules need to 
be interpreted in order to be applicable (Heidenhain 2003: 193f.; Immenga/Mestmäcker 
2007: 890f.).
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty generally prohibits: 
any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods … insofar as it affects trade between Member States.
Yet European Treaty rules do not absolutely prohibit state aid. Articles 87(2) and, more 
importantly in practice, 87(3) of the EC Treaty provide the exceptions to the rule, there-
by leaving room for maneuver on national state aid policies. Article 87(3) of the EC 
Treaty lists certain categories of aid that “may be considered to be compatible with the 
common market”: 
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnor-
mally low or where there is serious underemployment; 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, 
where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest; 
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(d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading 
conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common 
interest.
Most secondary rules of soft and hard state aid law, which will be dealt with in Section 3 
of this paper, are an interpretation of these exceptions. In an increasingly complex sys-
tem of “communications,” “guidelines” and “frameworks,” the Commission has codified 
its own standards for assessing certain categories of state aid. Formally, these rules are 
not binding upon the Member States, and for this reason they are constantly referred to 
as soft rules “which, in principle, have no legally binding force but which nevertheless 
may have practical effects” (Snyder 1994: 198; Senden 2004: 112; Cini 2001; Aldestam 
2004; European Commission 2007a). In contrast, hard state aid law that exempts certain 
categories of state aid from European control is based on Article 89 of the EC Treaty and 
has direct effect. 
As becomes clear from the above cited provisions, EC Treaty rules on state aid leave 
plenty of room for dispute. Even though both issues are interlinked, we may broadly 
distinguish between two sets of conflicts: (1) conflicts about the scope of the state aid 
prohibition and its enforcement, i.e. the depth of negative integration and (2) conflicts 
about the admissible exceptions to this prohibition, i.e. Member States’ remaining pos-
sibilities to design their individual state aid policies. 
Conflicts about the prohibition of state aid
With regard to conflicts about the state aid prohibition, the literature stresses the im-
portant role played by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in empowering the Com-
mission against the resistance of Member States (Smith 1998; Lehmkuhl 2008). For 
a long time, state aid control was seen as the “poor relative” of European cartel and 
merger control (Hansen/Van Ysendyck/Zuhlke 2004: 182). While the Member States 
had agreed, in principle, on the need for supranational state aid control, each of them 
had an incentive to deviate from common state aid discipline, particularly in times 
of economic crisis (Lavdas/Mendrinou 1995: 29f.; Mathijsen 1972). The Commission’s 
instruments to overcome this “prisoner’s dilemma” situation (Wolf 2005: 56) were yet 
to be developed. 
Member States initially circumvented European state aid control by resorting to “cre-
ative” forms of state aid. Rather than granting direct subsidies, they conceded tax privi-
leges, abstained from collecting social security contributions or sold public property 
under market value in order to favor particular enterprises. Reacting to this, the Com-
mission interpreted the scope of the state aid prohibition broadly, including not just ad-
vantages from direct grants but also other, more indirect forms having the same aid ef-
fect (Plender 2003). Although in most cases the ECJ supported the Commission’s Treaty 
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interpretations, it also defined clear limits on European state aid control. For example, 
the ECJ ruled in its 2001 PreussenElektra judgment that regulatory privileges not involv-
ing any budgetary burden for the state were not covered by the state aid prohibition 
(Koenig/Kühling/Ritter 2005: 121f.). 
Member States also informed the Commission only selectively about new state aid mea-
sures or simply ignored the Commission’s prohibitions, without significant risk. Based 
on an earlier ECJ ruling, however, the Commission started in 1983 to oblige Member 
States to recover illegally granted state aid from the benefiting enterprises (Smith 1998: 
64). Moreover, by mobilizing competitors to complain about state aid beneficiaries, the 
Commission gained information independently from national policy makers, making it 
less likely that state aid could be granted secretly (Smith 1998: 63, 2001: 224). 
Arguably, state aid control today is more deeply integrated than had been foreseen by 
the Member States when the Treaties of Rome were drafted, and in most cases non-
compliance with European state aid rules is too costly to be an option (Smith 1998: 
61). By adopting the Procedural Regulation No. 659/1999, the Member States finally 
accepted their obligation not to grant state aid without prior Commission consent and 
acknowledged the Commission’s competence to order recovery of illegal aid. 
The link between the two different sets of conflicts on state aid control and state aid 
policy now becomes clear: the harder it gets for the Member States to circumvent Eu-
ropean state aid control and the costlier it gets to simply ignore it, the more politically 
salient becomes the question of which types of state aid are still considered to be admis-
sible in the common market. 
Conflicts about admissible state aid
The conflicts about the admissible exceptions to the state aid prohibition revolve around 
the remaining opportunities Member States have to design their own state aid policies. 
Which types of state aid can still be justified as compatible with the internal market, 
even if they distort competition? Who will determine the compatibility of certain types 
of state aid, and by what standards?
The potential for conflicts of interest regarding admissible state aid is immense. State 
aid policy can be justified for reasons of both allocative efficiency and redistributive 
justice. The economics of when state aid is likely to increase allocative efficiency by cor-
recting a particular market failure are far from uncontroversial (Friederiszick/Röller/
Verouden 2006: 13–15; Koenig/Füg 2005). Just how far state aid should serve redistribu-
tive goals is not an economic or legal question; the answer rests largely on political con-
siderations (Friederiszick/Röller/Verouden 2006: 15–19). What’s more, efficiency (or 
social welfare) and social justice can have very different meanings depending on what 
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the word “social” refers to. A measure that looks efficient from a national point of view 
does not necessarily enhance European welfare if it produces negative externalities in 
other Member States. A region that seems relatively rich compared to other European 
countries can be among the poorer regions of the country it belongs to: depending 
on the applicable standard of social justice, this region might qualify for redistributive 
state aid. In the same way, prohibiting state aid to a big European enterprise might be 
necessary to protect competition in the internal market, even though it might put the 
enterprise at a disadvantage when competing on a global scale.
The ambiguity of EC Treaty law reflects this diversity of interests. In practice, how-
ever, it provides little guidance on how to balance the goal of undistorted competition 
against the efficiency and equity considerations of national policy makers (e.g. referring 
to admissible state aid for “the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas,” emphasis added). 
Even within the Commission, the potential positive effects of national state aid are 
controversial. State aid control affects many different policies – represented by differ-
ent DGs (Directorates General) in the Commission – and thus conflicts with Com-
munity goals other than just competition (Cini/McGowan 1998: 42–45). For example, 
the DG for Regional Policy (DG REGIO) has repeatedly criticized the DG for Com-
petition (DG COMP) for marginalizing the positive, redistributive aspects of regional 
state aid (Lavdas/Mendrinou 1999: 40; Cini/McGowan 1998: 147). As a result, the re-
vision of soft law on regional aid has been synchronized with the planning period for 
the Structural Funds and the criteria for designating eligible regions have been partly 
harmonized (Wishlade 1993, 1998: 354f., 2003: 145–179). The DG Enterprise and In-
dustry (DG ENTR) has been pushing for a less restrictive approach towards state aid 
to promote investment in research, development, and innovation (Maincent/Navarro 
2006: 46–48). Depending on whether Commission officials are charged primarily with 
executive or administrative tasks, they will be more or less open to political consider-
ations beyond their own portfolio (Cini/McGowan 1998: 45). Finally, the Legal Service 
internally controls the legal compatibility of Commission drafts with the Treaty law 
and has a “reputation for caution … trying to restrain Commission activism” (Cini/
McGowan 1998: 44). 
Despite these internal conflicts, the Commission tries to speak with one voice in its 
negotiations with Member States. Drafts of new or revised state aid rules are discussed 
internally before the Member States are consulted. Once a common Commission posi-
tion is defined, it is defended in objective terms (“common interest,” “win-win develop-
ments,” European Commission 2005) and the potential for conflict is de-emphasized. 
For example, in its reports on competition policy the Commission has repeatedly denied 
conflicts or contradictions between competition policy on the one side and regional or 
industrial policy on the other side (European Commission 1991: pt. 78, 1972: pt. 45). 
Moreover, while Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty establishes a negative condition, re-
quiring admissible aid not to distort competition “to an extent contrary to the common 
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interest,” a positive interpretation of “common interest” dominates in practice: “State 
aid may be declared compatible with the Treaty provided it fulfils clearly defined objec-
tives of common interest and does not distort intra-community competition and trade to 
an extent contrary to the common interest” (European Commission 2005: 4, emphasis 
in the original document; see also Gross 2003: 64). 
With regard to questions above, it is therefore fair to assume that the Commission’s 
position is the following: first, it sees itself as competent to decide conflicts about which 
types of state aid are still admissible and enjoys significant discretion in doing so (“may 
be considered to be compatible”, Article 87[3] of the EC Treaty, emphasis added). Sec-
ond, according to the Commission, admissible state aid has to be justified with reference 
to European rather than national standards. Both positions are also supported by the 
rulings of the European courts (Heidenhain 2003: 193f.). 
The Member States’ positions on state aid policies vary considerably more than even 
within the Commission. Similarly to the Commission’s DGs, divisions exist between 
different ministries. Unsurprisingly, ministries of finance tend to be less positive about 
state aid than will other ministries entrusted to promote industrial or regional develop-
ment. More importantly, industrial policy traditions greatly differ between EU Member 
States, ranging from countries with very restrictive state aid policies to other countries 
in which state aid is not only used to address market failures but also for redistributive 
purposes (Dylla 1998). For example, state aid levels in the Netherlands or in the UK 
have consistently been clearly below the EU average; Estonia hardly has any state aid 
policy at all. In their comment on the SAAP, UK officials advocate a more restrictive 
approach towards state aid policy and argue “that State aid is generally only justified 
as a response to market failure” (United Kingdom 2005: 2, emphasis in the original 
document). Countries like Sweden or Denmark grant significant amounts of state aid, 
targeted almost exclusively towards goals of market correction, e.g. towards measures of 
environmental protection. Since reunification, German state aid policy has been largely 
redistributive, supporting regional development and industrial restructuring in the 
new Länder (Schütte/Hix 1995). Similarities exist between German state aid policy after 
reunification and the policy of some new Member States such as Poland (European 
Commission 2007c). Polish authorities have criticized the Commission for not giving 
enough consideration to the particular economic and social conditions of its transition 
economy (Poland 2005). 
Member States vary greatly in their opinions on which types of state aid should still be 
admissible in the internal market. In contrast to the different DGs, EU Member States 
do not establish a common position before entering consultations on new state aid rules 
proposed by the Commission. However heterogeneous these state aid policy traditions 
may be, we can broadly distinguish two phases of Member States’ positions on the Com-
mission’s competence to decide conflicts about admissible aid. Member States originally 
contested the Commission’s efforts to establish general criteria for admissible state aid, 
and the Council rejected the proposed secondary legislation (Lavdas/Mendrinou 1999: 
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29f.). Given the tightening of European state aid control since the late 1980s, however, 
Member States have adopted a more positive attitude towards European rules on ad-
missible aid. Such rules at least improve legal certainty about which possibilities for 
national state aid policies remain. 
Before we analyze this historical development in greater detail in the next section, Table 1 
illustrates some of the possible trade-offs and dividing lines between different actors’ 
policy priorities in the field of state aid:
Table 1  Multiple policy goals in the field of state aid
Policy function
Market making Market correction Redistribution
Specific goal Competition Competitiveness Cohesion
State aid policy State aid prohibition R&D aid, SME aid Regional aid
Commission DG COMP DG ENTR DG REGIO
Member States Netherlands, Estonia Sweden, Denmark Germany, Poland
Enterprises Competitors State aid beneficiaries
3 Conflict management through soft and hard law
The vagueness of the EC Treaty rules creates many conflicts between state aid control 
and state aid policy. At the same time, the need for interpretation of the Treaty rules and 
the heterogeneity of Member states’ interests have become major sources of the Com-
mission’s power. 
In its first Report on Competition Policy, the Commission deplored the lack of a real 
framework to guide its control of state aid (European Commission 1971: pt. 138). After 
the Council refused to agree upon secondary legislation, the Commission started to 
develop this framework via soft law. By binding itself to soft law, the Commission has 
become less exposed to political conflicts about individual state aid measures. Soft state 
aid law mainly concretizes the Commission’s approach towards possible exceptions to 
the state aid prohibition. In developing its soft law, the Commission has increasingly 
defined positive European standards of what it considers to be “good” state aid policy. 
In addition, the Commission has created ways to make its soft law practically binding 
upon Member States. Statistical data shows that Member States increasingly adapt their 
state aid policies to the Commission’s standards. It took until 1998 for the Commission 
and the Council to agree to secondary legislation on state aid control. Since then, pre-
viously soft rules have gradually been transformed into directly applicable regulations 
which exempt certain categories of state aid from Commission control. Thus, possible 
exceptions to the state aid prohibition become harmonized at the European level. 
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Making a virtue of necessity
Soft law was not the Commission’s first choice in the area of state aid control. On the 
basis of Article 89 of the EC Treaty, the Council may – on proposal by the Commis-
sion and after consulting the European Parliament – adopt secondary legislation on 
European state aid control. Two early Commission draft regulations, however, on the 
procedure of European state aid control and on the exemption of certain categories of 
regional aid, were blocked by the Council in 1966 and 1972 (Lavdas/Mendrinou 1995, 
1999: 29f.; Evans 1997). At a time of economic decline when Member States were in-
creasingly subsidizing their own industries, state aid control was “both imperative and 
impossible” (Cini/McGowan 1998: 143). 
In reaction to the Council’s unwillingness to agree upon secondary legislation, the 
Commission changed its approach in favor of “a flexible strategy of enforcement aim-
ing at utilising the absence of a Council Regulation in the direction of gradually form-
ing a practice founded on the Commission’s political sense of possible impact” (Lavdas/
Mendrinou 1999: 30). Along with individual state aid decisions, soft law became the 
main instrument of this strategy. 
The legal basis of soft state aid law has been controversial for a long time (Schütterle 
1995: 393f.; Aldestam 2004). As a result of an ECJ judgement on the transparency di-
rective, European secondary rules must explicitly refer to a legal basis in order to bind 
the Member States.1 The soft law terminology has been even less clear, as we can find 
Community frameworks and guidelines, Commission communications, recommenda-
tions, notices, decisions, and letters, as well as revisions, corrigenda, and amendments 
to the respective documents. Today, the Commission has simplified its terminology and 
constantly refers to its state aid frameworks and guidelines as “appropriate measures” in 
the sense of Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty. Based on this Treaty provision and without 
explicit approval by the Member States, however, soft law only has the status of a non-
binding Commission recommendation. Formally, soft law only binds the Commission 
itself in its decision-making on state aid cases (Mestmäcker/Schweitzer 2004: 1108f.). 
The Commission also remains free to revise its soft law whenever this is seen to be “re-
quired by the progressive development or by the functioning of the common market” 
(Article 88[1] of the EC Treaty, Schütterle 1995: 394).
Reacting to the Council’s initial refusal to adopt secondary legislation, and unanticipat-
ed by the Member states, the Commission has made a virtue of necessity. Most authors 
as well as Commission officials themselves stress the procedural improvements result-
ing from state aid soft law. In contrast to a pure case-by-case approach, the soft-law 
approach has increased time-effectiveness, legal certainty and transparency of Com-
mission control (Rawlinson 1993; Cini 2001: 199; Lehmkuhl 2008: 143f.). By binding 
itself to soft law, the Commission has also decreased its exposure to political pressure in 
1 Case C-325/91 France v. Commission [1993] ECR I-3283, 16 June 1993.
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individual state aid decisions: “The Commission needs rules to discipline itself. Rules 
are the best safeguard against political decisions which, if they were to proliferate, would 
destroy all state aid control” (Rawlinson 1993: 58). At the same time, soft law allows for 
more discretion and flexibility in developing the rules than a rigid hard law approach 
(Cini 2001: 199, 205).
What has been noted less prominently, however, is the substantive aspect of these rules. 
In dealing with the exceptions to the state aid prohibition, they “imply a positive … 
dimension to the policy which has in practice proved extremely controversial” (Cini/
McGowan 1998: 18; Kerber 1998). Conflicts of interest do not disappear from the field 
of state aid control; instead, they are partly shifted from the control of individual state 
aid measures to the design or revision of soft state aid rules. Essentially, soft and hard 
state aid rules are conflict-solving devices, harmonizing the standards of admissible 
state aid.
Defining positive criteria of state aid policy
State aid policy is still a national competence. A major compendium on European state 
aid law starts by highlighting this aspect (Quigley 2003: 2):
It should be noted at the outset that there has been no attempt to harmonize national rules gov-
erning the award of State aid. Aid is granted by the Member States in accordance with relevant 
national law and policy. … Rather, EC intervention in the field of State aid is largely negative 
in nature.
Yet the Commission’s soft law mainly deals with the exceptions to the state aid prohibi-
tion, thereby explicitly addressing questions of state aid policy. The Commission’s State 
Aid Action Plan calls for “less and better targeted state aid,” referring to a similar plea of 
the Stockholm European Council in 2001 (European Commission 2005). Large parts of 
the document focus on positively defining “better targeted aid” rather than on tighten-
ing state aid control (“less aid”). The introductory chapter puts state aid policy in the 
“context of the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs” (ibid.: 3–8). The core chapter lists 
“key priorities” of state aid policy such as “targeting innovation and R&D to strengthen 
the knowledge society,” “creating a better business climate and stimulating entrepre-
neurship” and “encouraging an environmentally sustainable future” (ibid.: 8–12). The 
concluding chapter outlines the main steps for revising soft and hard law on admissible 
state aid (ibid.: 12–18). This approach is not new, however, but rather a continuation of 
the Commission’s efforts to regulate possible exceptions to the state aid prohibition.
The early Commission soft law built on the wording of the Treaty provisions on com-
patible state aid, in particular on Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. This provision was 
interpreted to mean that compatible state aid should be targeted towards specific sectors 
Blauberger: From Negative to Positive Integration? 15
(“certain economic activities”) or specific regions (“certain economic areas”). Starting 
with the textiles and clothing industry in 1971, the Commission further developed its 
control criteria for state aid to the coal industry in 1973, followed by fibers and steel in 
1977. Primary guidelines on regional state aid have been applied by the Commission 
since 1972 (Rawlinson 1993: 54). In order not to weaken its own control, however, the 
Commission has been rather hesitant to design rules on other categories of compatible 
aid. An exception has been the framework on environmental aid, first issued in 1975. 
It was not until state aid control was tightened in the second half of the 1980s (see Cini/
McGowan 1998: 144–146) that new soft law was developed. By clarifying the rules, and 
thus increasing legal certainty for permissible types of state aid, the Commission pro-
vided incentives to bring national state aid polices in line with its own priorities. The 
first framework on state aid for research and development (R&D) in 1986 marked a 
shift within the Commission towards such a more positive approach to state aid control 
(Cini/McGowan 1998: 154). The framework was later expanded in order to include 
“innovation-related aid,” which was justified by explicit reference to the Lisbon objec-
tives (European Commission 2006a). The promotion of SMEs became a major concern 
within the context of European state aid control in the late 1980s (Lavdas/Mendrinou 
1995, 1999). Today, many state aid rules include more generous exceptions for SMEs 
than for large enterprises. When the guidelines on environmental aid were reviewed 
recently, the Commission asked in its questionnaire to interested parties whether addi-
tional categories such as aid for the “safety of civilians and their environment” or for the 
“health of consumers” should be introduced (European Commission 2007b). The final 
version of the guidelines significantly raises the threshold for admissible environmental 
aid, and this move is justified by explicit reference to the “Energy and Climate Change 
package” of the Commission (European Commission 2008). 
These aid categories do not follow from the wording of the Treaty provisions (Mest-
mäcker/Schweitzer 2004: 1110) – they rather indicate the evolution of the Commis-
sion’s own state aid policy priorities. 
An overview of soft law on possible exceptions to the state aid prohibition as it is cur-
rently applied by the Commission is given in Table 2. 
Table 2  Soft law on possible exceptions to the state aid prohibition
General rules – Regional investments
– Research, development, and innovation
– Environmental protection
– Risk capital
– Rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty
Sector-specific rules – Broadcasting
– Cinematographic and other audiovisual works
– Electricity (stranded costs)
– Postal services 
– Shipbuilding 
– Steel
– Synthetic fibers (motor vehicles industry) 
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The types of state aid which are not sector-specific have been gradually subsumed un-
der the term “horizontal aid.” At the same time, horizontal aid has become largely syn-
onymous with “good” or “modern” state aid that is in line with the Commission’s own 
priorities. First of all, horizontal aid is regarded as being less distortive to competition 
than sectoral aid (Friederiszick/Röller/Verouden 2006: 27). More importantly, it con-
tributes to the Commission’s own market-correcting or redistributive policy goals, and 
therefore can be linked to an objective of “common interest.” 
Regional aid control provides a telling example of how national state aid policies in-
creasingly have to adjust to the Commission’s positive interpretation of the “common 
interest.” Earlier guidelines on national regional aid were already less concerned with 
distortions of competition or trade between Member States and more “with the sub-
stance of regional policy” (Wishlade 2003: 89, emphasis in the original text). Regional 
aid was seen as a legitimate instrument to improve cohesion. However, the guidelines 
represented a compromise between two different views of cohesion, namely national 
cohesion and intra-Community cohesion. Regions which were seriously underdevel-
oped relative to the Community average could receive state aid based on Article 87(3)
(a) of the EC Treaty; regions which were disadvantaged in relation to their nation-
al average were eligible for state aid on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. 
In a “non-paper” preparing the revision of the regional aid guidelines for the period 
2007–2013, the Commission proposed to phase out entirely the second category of aid 
and only allow regional aid that contributes to the objective of intra-Community cohe-
sion (Battista 2005). This proposal met with strong opposition from some of the richer 
Member States, expressed in a joint letter from the UK, France, Germany and Austria 
to Commissioner Kroes. Eventually, the Commission had to make concessions to these 
Member States, but the possibilities to grant regional aid with national cohesion objec-
tives have nonetheless been significantly constrained (Fothergill 2006: 10–19). 
By defining criteria of well-targeted state aid at the European level, the Commission 
increases the burden of proof on the Member States. Since the Commission itself largely 
assumes that any state aid measure will distort competition (Röller 2005: 44; Wishlade 
2003: 10), the Member States must prove the compatibility of their state aid policies 
with the soft law criteria or risk lengthy and uncertain control procedures. In the SAAP, 
the Commission explicitly requires the Member States “to provide the necessary evi-
dence in this respect, prior to any implementation of the envisaged measure” (European 
Commission 2005: 6). This could make proving the compatibility of state aid even more 
demanding for the Member states: the SAAP advocates a “refined economic approach” 
to state aid control, which not only requires the identification of a clear objective of 
common interests in order to get Commission approval, but also demands that state aid 
be more efficient than alternative instruments in reaching its goal (ibid.: 6). 
The German government was very critical of this proposition: “In the opinion of the 
Federal government, the Commission possesses the competence neither to allocate re-
sources nor to harmonise legal and financial policies nor to evaluate the success of na-
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tional state aid policies” (Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2005: 2). 
Nevertheless, the Commission has since introduced a so-called “incentive test” into new 
soft law provisions, according to which the Member States must prove that a certain 
state aid measure “enables the beneficiary to carry out activities or projects which it 
would not have carried out as such in the absence of the aid” in order to get Commis-
sion approval (Evans/Nyssens 2007: 4).
Binding the Member States
In order to have a real impact on national state aid policies, the Commission needed to 
find ways to make its soft law practically binding for the Member States. This section 
describes the two mechanisms by which the Commission has largely achieved this goal: 
(1) soft law can be enforced indirectly via individual state aid decisions; and (2) Mem-
ber States can be forced into explicit approval of soft state aid rules which then become 
formally binding. Commission statistics show that since the early 1990s, Member States’ 
aid policies have partially converged towards “less and better targeted state aid.” 
The Commission imposes its soft law on the Member States through individual state 
aid decisions. While soft law binds only the Commission itself, Commission decisions 
on individual state aid cases are binding for the Member States. Member States still 
have the right to draw up new state aid measures that do not match the Commission 
criteria set out in its soft law; most likely, however, the Commission will then either 
force Member States to adapt the state aid measure in question, following investigation 
under its soft rules, or it will come to a negative decision on the measure and prohibit 
its implementation (Gross 2003: 103). If Member States are unwilling to adapt their 
measures, the Commission has created significant negative incentives for the potential 
beneficiaries of state aid. Just the threat to prolong its control procedure and to order 
the possible recovery of illegal aid creates significant legal uncertainty for the firms, 
and this uncertainty may be sufficient to discourage them from demanding potentially 
inadmissible aid in the first place. The low rate of negative Commission decisions on 
state aid thus does not prove the ineffectiveness of European state aid control. Rather, 
Member States often anticipate Commission control and try to frame their state aid 
measures in a way that fits the criteria positively defined in state aid soft law (Smith 
1996; Dylla 1997: 12f.).2 
Many Commission state aid decisions, particularly negative ones, are challenged in the 
European Courts. The most prominent Commission “defeats” relate to questions re-
2 This is most obvious in the case of so-called state aid schemes, i.e. national programs involving 
a multitude of state aid measures but which require Commission notification and approval only 
once. Very often, e.g. in the case of regional investment programs, these state aid schemes consti-
tute a more or less comprehensive transposition of the Commission’s soft rules into national law.
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garding the scope of state aid control, as in the PreussenElektra case mentioned above. 
Crucially, however, the Courts largely abstain from reassessing the economic and social 
reasoning underlying the Commission’s state aid decisions (Gross 2003: 57f.). They may 
reject a state aid decision if they find that the Commission has not correctly applied its 
own soft law (Lehmkuhl 2008: 145), yet this is a source of power, rather than a weakness 
of the Commission, as it increases the credibility of the self-binding rules (Smith 1998: 
66f.). If the Commission becomes dissatisfied with existing soft law, it may be obliged 
to apply it to the individual case at hand. For the future, however, it can propose new 
rules whenever this is seen to be “required by the progressive development or by the 
functioning of the common market” (Article 88[1] of the EC Treaty). 
The Commission has also developed a second mechanism to force Member States to 
explicitly approve its soft law on state aid, and even to adapt existing state aid mea-
sures that were declared compatible with the revised rules in the past. If a Member 
State refuses to accept the revised soft law, the Commission threatens to open formal 
investigations into all existing state aid measures that fall under the new rules: “[t]his 
will normally have the effect of forcing the Member State concerned to accept the Com-
mission’s policy” (Quigley 2003: 282f.). The Commission has had repeated success with 
this strategy, e.g. getting the approval of Spain and Germany for its framework on state 
aid to the motor vehicle industry (Cini 2001: 201f) and forcing Sweden to accept the 
revision of this framework (Quigley 2003: 284). The most recent conflict in which the 
Commission resorted to this strategy concerned the revised guidelines on regional aid. 
After winning the approval of 24 EU Member States, with only Germany refusing to ac-
cept the new rules, the Commission opened an investigation into all German regional 
aid schemes (European Commission 2006b). The title of the Commission’s press re-
lease – “formal investigation against Germany” (emphasis added) – already reveals the 
punitive character of this measure. In individual state aid cases, the Commission usu-
ally uses more neutral language (“investigations into”) and emphasizes that opening a 
formal investigation does not prejudice its final decision on whether the proposed aid is 
admissible. As for the new guidelines on regional aid, the Commission closed its formal 
investigation once Germany had finally approved the revised rules.
These examples show the limits of this Commission strategy: only if a broad majority 
of Member States agree with its soft law can the Commission credibly threaten indi-
vidual Member States and force them into final approval. In order to build a broad 
consensus, the Commission consults Member States in “multilateral meetings” during 
the development process for soft state aid law. The status of these meetings is similar to 
that of the consultation of the Advisory Committee on State Aid under the Procedural 
Regulation: the Commission has the final say. The guidelines for regional state aid in 
the period 2000–2006, for example, were discussed in three multilateral meetings. Even 
after the last multilateral meeting, an important modification was introduced by the 
Com mission into the final document, without prior coordination with the Member 
States (Mén dez/Wishlade/Yuill 2006: 593).
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Sooner or later, the Commission’s soft law becomes practically binding even for the 
minority of Member States who initially refuse approval. From the Commission’s point 
of view, state aid soft law is therefore no less binding than traditional secondary legisla-
tion:
The force of written precedents in the Commission is such that, once decided, rules in what-
ever form become, in practice, binding on the Commission, and hence on their addressees, the 
Member States, to whom they are applied in the Commission’s day-to-day aid control work. 
(Rawlinson 1993: 59)
This Commission standpoint has become most obvious in the accession negotiations 
with the Central and Eastern European countries. According to the third Copenhagen 
criterion, the candidate countries must prove their ability to take on the obligations 
of membership which follow from the acquis communautaire in order to become EU 
Member States. In the field of state aid control, the acquis has been defined very broadly, 
as based on Article 87 of the EC Treaty and including “the present and future secondary 
legislation, frameworks, guidelines and other relevant administrative acts in force in 
the Community, as well as the case law”3 of the European Courts (Schütterle 2002: 582; 
Cremona 2003: 270). 
In order to evaluate national state aid policies in the light of the goals of “less and better 
targeted” state aid, the Commission has developed two broad indicators. The amount 
of state aid in relation to the GDP is called the state aid level. As for the state aid objec-
tives, the Commission distinguishes between sectoral and horizontal state aid.4 The goal 
of reducing state aid levels is being met: data from the EU State Aid Scoreboard clearly 
indicates a drop in national state aid expenditures since the early 1990s (see Table 3). 
From 1993 to 2006, the average aid level in EU Member States declined to less than half 
of its original value.5 Earlier studies on EU Member States’ aid policies come to the 
same conclusions and often attribute the reduction of overall state aid levels to the im-
pact of European state aid control (Smith 1996: 575; Wolf 2005: 87; Aydin 2007). More 
importantly for the argument of this paper, we can observe a clear redirection of state 
aid towards horizontal objectives, and thus an alignment of national state aid policies 
with the Commission’s policy goals. Furthermore, while the reduction of overall state 
3 This phrase is included in Article 2 of all implementing rules on state aid control that have been 
decided upon by the respective Association Councils with the Central and Eastern European 
countries.
4 The Commission’s methodology in comparing sectoral and horizontal aid makes even clearer 
what is considered to be “bad” or “good” state aid. The rules for rescue and restructuring aid 
do not discriminate between sectors – however, this type of state aid is regarded as particularly 
distortive to competition and is therefore counted as sectoral aid. In contrast, regional aid is 
mostly counted as horizontal aid, although it discriminates between different regions. For the 
Commission’s methodology, see: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_re-
ports/conceptual_remarks.html (accessed 14 September 2007). 
5 The deviations in 1997 can be explained by one large individual state aid measure (Röller/Frie-
deriszick 2006).
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aid levels seems to have reached its limits, the trend towards higher shares of horizontal 
state aid is still ongoing. Since 1999, we can observe an absolute rise in state aid towards 
horizontal objectives.
Transforming mature soft law into hard law
It was only in 1998 that the Commission and the Council agreed to adopt secondary 
legislation on state aid control. For about 25 years, the Commission had not made any 
attempt to move beyond soft state aid law. This development, however, was only partly 
due to the Council’s original unwillingness to adopt secondary legislation. When, in 
1990, the Italian Council presidency proposed an initiative towards secondary legisla-
tion on state aid control, it was the Commission that refused to submit a new draft regu-
lation (Smith 2001: 220). The Commission suspected that some Member States aimed 
to weaken state aid control by involving themselves more deeply in state aid regulation 
(Gross 2003: 128).
The main reason why the Commission reconsidered its position towards hard state aid 
law in 1996 was increased workload (Mederer 1996; Smith 1998). The number of inves-
tigations had risen due to the expanded scope of state aid control, more systematic no-
tifications by Member States of their state aid measures, and more frequent complaints 
from enterprises about illegal state aid (Mederer 1996: 12f.). Because of its limited hu-
man resources, the Commission had to get rid of minor state aid cases in order to con-
centrate on the most important and difficult ones. Moreover, soft law had become “suf-
ficiently precise” in some areas to be applied in a more decentralized way (ibid.: 13).
Table 3 EU State Aid Scoreboard on state aid levels and objectives, 1992–2006
Year Total aid  
as % of GDP
Horizontal aid  
as % of total aid
Horizontal aid  
in billion €
EU-12
1992 0.8 52.2 34.3
1993 0.8 48.9 32.3
1994 0.8 45.3 27.4
1995 0.7 54.7 32.1
1996 0.7 54.8 31.9
1997 0.9 39.1 30.8
1998 0.6 57.7 28.9
EU-15 1999 0.4 67.1 27.0
2000 0.4 69.6 29.6
2001 0.5 67.2 30.8
2002 0.5 66.9 33.9
2003 0.4 79.3 33.0
EU-25
2004 0.4 76.3 36.2
2005 0.4 82.9 39.2
2006 0.4 85.2 40.8
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Based on the Enabling Regulation No. 994/1998, the Commission has now adopted 
several Block Exemption Regulations (BERs) which allow Member States to implement 
certain state aid measures without ex ante approval by the Commission. To a large ex-
tent, these BERs consist of previously soft state aid rules. As in the case of soft law, the 
Commission enjoys autonomy in the design of these rules – only the Advisory Commit-
tee on State Aid has to be consulted. The first generation of BERs concerned SME (small 
and medium-sized enterprises) aid, training aid, employment aid and small amounts 
of state aid – so-called de minimis aid. The second generation of BERs specifically ad-
dressed state aid in the agriculture and fishery sectors. In 2006, the Commission mostly 
exempted regional investment aid. Currently, an additional BER on environmental aid 
is being debated and consultations have been launched on a general BER, integrating 
the regulations into one document and including risk capital and innovation aid for 
SMEs. 
Exempting state aid from ex ante control does not only reduce the Commission’s work-
load, it also gives back some autonomy to the Member States – as long as their state aid 
policies are in line with the BERs’ criteria. By exempting certain types of state aid, the 
Commission creates further incentives to adjust national policies to its own state aid 
priorities. The Commission explicitly states that BERs are designed to “facilitate the 
possibilities for Member States to grant subsidies that clearly fulfill horizontal objectives 
in line with the European Union’s Lisbon objectives (such as environmental protection, 
or promotion of research and development)” (European Commission 2007a). 
A Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council shows that Mem-
ber States increasingly resort to state aid measures falling under the BERs (European 
Commission 2006c, 2007c: 33). The number of state aid measures which need to be 
presented to and approved by the Commission has decreased significantly in areas in 
which BERs exist; accordingly, the number of registered measures under the BERs has 
constantly risen (see Table 4). EU enlargement has reinforced this development. Com-
ments on the Commission announcement to exempt additional categories of aid have 
been largely positive: drafting a general BER and raising the limit for de minimis aid 
were among the Commission propositions in the SAAP which received the most sup-
port (European Commission 2006d: 6f.). 
Table 4 State aid measures under the block exemptions regulations, 2001–2007
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*
SME 102 123 139 149 197 183 246
Training 48 80 55 79 69 57 86
Employment – – 8 21 26 35 27
Agriculture – – – 72 88 119 307
Fishery – – – 1 22 24 0
Regional – – – – – – 154
Total 150 203 202 322 401 418 820
* Until 09/2007.
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Conclusion: The limits of positive integration from above 
European state aid control has moved beyond purely negative integration (cf. Mederer 
2003: 987). The Commission has been the major driving force of this process, through 
its interpretation of the EC Treaty provisions and its development of soft and hard 
rules on admissible state aid. Today, BERs are as close to positive integration as state 
aid control can possibly get, with regard to their form as well as their content. They 
harmonize the possible exceptions to the state aid prohibition in Article 87 (1) of the 
EC Treaty (Kerber 1998: 51; Gross 2003: 104). Many potential conflicts about weighing 
the goal of undistorted competition against other goals of state aid policy, therefore, no 
longer arise at the European level in individual state aid cases. It has been shown that 
EU Member States increasingly resort to state aid measures falling under the BERs, and 
that their state aid policies are converging towards the horizontal objectives advocated 
by the Commission. 
Two factors have been responsible for the Commission’s ability to act as a supranational 
entrepreneur of positive integration: vague Treaty rules and heterogeneous Member 
States’ interests. EC Treaty rules reflect the conflicting policy goals in the field of state 
aid and they entrust the Commission to balance them in concrete cases. The ECJ has 
limited the scope of European state aid control and checks the Commission’s practices 
for procedural correctness, but it largely follows a policy of “judicial self-restraint” (Hei-
denhain 2003: 193; Immenga/Mestmäcker 2007: 890f.) with regard to the underlying 
assessment of admissible state aid. Member States’ conflicting views on national state 
aid policies meant that they were initially unwilling to agree upon secondary rules, and 
later were unable to counter the Commission’s increasingly complex and detailed vision 
of “good” state aid policy (Cini/McGowan 1998: 123). Essentially, the Commission’s 
strategy can be described as one of “lesser evil” (Schmidt 2000: 50) from the Member 
States’ perspective. Compared to case-by-case control, state aid soft law has improved 
legal certainty, and rather than being exclusively oriented toward competition, it left 
some scope for the design of national state aid policies. Compared to the remaining 
uncertainties under soft law, particularly those arising from lengthy Commission inves-
tigations, directly applicable BERs further clarify the remaining possibilities of national 
policy makers and relieve them from burdensome notification procedures. In exchange, 
the Commission gains influence on national state aid policies.
Where, however, are the limits on this positive integration from above? First of all, and 
most importantly, European state aid rules do not establish a full-fledged European 
state aid policy (see Table 5). The Commission cannot oblige national governments to 
spend state aid on particular purposes, i.e. to implement a harmonized state aid policy. 
The ultimate decision to grant state aid remains a national competence, and Member 
States still enjoy significant choice between different types of admissible aid when it 
comes to the specific state aid targets. 
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Furthermore, within this system of harmonized exceptions to the state aid prohibition, 
Member States still have two options to influence the substance and the degree of posi-
tive integration in the field of state aid. 
First, as has already been mentioned, the Commission cannot issue soft law or BERs 
against strong opposition from numerous Member States. It must build as broad a con-
sensus as possible during the process of rule-making. The revision of the guidelines 
on regional aid illustrates this point: after opposition from France, Germany and the 
UK, the Commission had to modify its original proposal. Yet there is good reason to 
interpret the Commission’s first draft as strategically radical, drafted to ensure that a 
compromise would still have a clear impact on Member States’ regional aid policies 
(Fothergill 2006: 15). Another example shows the limits of the Commission’s autonomy 
more clearly: because state aid to firms in financial difficulties heavily distorts compe-
tition, the Commission advocates strict limitations on these measures (Mestmäcker/
Schweitzer 2004: 1125f.). Nevertheless, Member States continue to grant such aid, even 
though the amounts are decreasing (European Commission 2006e). This is reflected in 
the guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid which are often criticized as being too 
lenient (Nicolaides/Kekelekis 2005). In this case, it is the Commission which has appar-
ently accepted the “lesser evil” of the existing rules rather than outright non-compliance 
with stricter rules. 
Second, depending on the (im)precision of secondary rules, Member States can adjust 
their national policies rhetorically rather than substantively to the Commission’s crite-
ria. The less precise the Commission’s rules on admissible state aid, the easier it becomes 
for Member States to justify distortive state aid on this basis. In the past, the regional aid 
guidelines have sometimes been considered to create such loopholes (Dylla 1997, 1998). 
Whether the recently adopted framework on research, development and innovation aid 
is sufficiently precise remains to be seen; the new category of innovation aid has been 
particularly criticized for its lack of precision (Ehricke 2005). Thus, by pushing even 
further towards a harmonization of admissible state aid, i.e. in the direction of positive 
integration, the Commission might run the risk of undermining the negative integra-
tion it has achieved so far. 
Table 5 European state aid control between the poles of negative and positive integration
Negative integration
European state aid control
Positive integration
–  State aid prohibition
–  Only exception:  
 undistortive state aid
State aid prohibition  
(not absolute);  
harmonization of possible  
exceptions (admissible aid)
–  Harmonization of  
national state  
aid policies
–  Community aid 
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